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Article 80 of the Rules of the
International Court of Justice
(1) The Court may entertain a counter-claim only if it comes within the
jurisdiction of the Court and is directly connected with the subject-matter of
the claim of the other party.
(2) A counter-claim shall be made in the Counter-Memorial and shall appear as
part of the submissions contained therein. The right of the other party to
present its views in writing on the counter-claim, in an additional pleading,
shall be preserved, irrespective of any decision of the Court, in accordance
with Article 45, paragraph 2, of these Rules, concerning the filing of further
written pleadings.
(3) Where an objection is raised concerning the application of paragraph 1 or
whenever the Court deems necessary, the Court shall take its decision thereon
after hearing the parties.
(1) La Cour ne peut connaître d’une demande reconventionnelle que si celle-ci
relève de sa compétence et est en connexité directe avec l’objet de la demande
de la partie adverse.
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(2) La demande reconventionnelle est présentée dans le contre-mémoire et figure
parmi les conclusions contenues dans celui-ci. Le droit qu’a l’autre partie
d’exprimer ses vues par écrit sur la demande reconventionnelle dans une pièce
de procédure additionnelle est préservé, indépendamment de toute décision
prise par la Cour, conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 45 du présent
Règlement, quant au dépôt de nouvelles pièces de procédure.
(3) En cas d’objection relative à l’application du paragraphe 1 ou à tout moment
lorsque la Cour le considère nécessaire, la Cour prend sa décision à cet égard
après avoir entendu les parties.
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A. Introduction
1

A ‘counter-claim’ is ‘an autonomous legal act’ by the respondent in a conten-

tious case before the Court, ‘the object of which is to submit a new claim to the Court’, one
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that is ‘linked to the principal claim, in so far as, formulated as a “counter” claim, it reacts to’
the principal claim.1 A counter-claim is not a defence on the merits to the principal claim;2
while it is a reaction to that claim, it is pursuing objectives other than simply dismissal of the
principal claim.3 Hence, the reason for allowing a counter-claim to be included as part of an
existing case is not because it assists in disposition of the principal claim but, rather, to assist
in the disposition of two autonomous claims.4 The counter-claim is allowed to become a part
of an existing case ‘in order to ensure better administration of justice, given the specific nature of the claims in question’ and ‘to achieve a procedural economy whilst enabling the
Court to have an overview of the respective claims of the parties and to decide them more
consistently’.5
2

The ICJ Statute does not directly address the issue of the respondent filing a

counter-claim against the applicant. Article 80 of the Rules, however, provides that the Court
may entertain such a counter-claim in certain circumstances, as a part of the incidental pro1

Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243,
256, para. 27; Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and Construction of
a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River, Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, ICJ Reports (2013), pp. 200, 208, para. 19; Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in
the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 18;
Kolb, ICJ, pp. 659-60.

2

See Rosenne, Leiden JIL (2001), p. 85.

3

Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 256, para. 27; see Anzilotti,
JDI (1930), pp. 867 et seq.; Salerno, RGDIP (1999), pp. 333 et seq.; Quintana, ICJ Litigation, p.
811.

4

Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 874 et seq.

5

Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 257, para. 30; see Genet, Rev.
de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), p. 148; Antonopoulos (2011), pp. 57 et seq.

5
ceedings of an existing case. The Court’s establishment of this rule is generally predicated on
its authority under Art. 48 of the Statute to ‘make orders for the conduct of the case’.
3

Counter-claims featured somewhat in the early life of the Court (in 1950–

1952), but then disappeared for several decades, only re-emerging in several cases after 1997.
Renewed interest in the use of counter-claims may be due to a desire by respondents to present to the Court a more balanced perspective of the conduct of the two States before it, since
inclusion of the counter-claim may force both the Court and the other party to confront certain facts and legal arguments that otherwise would not feature in the case. From the Court’s
perspective, allowing a counter-claim in the proper circumstances promotes the value of judicial economy,6 since addressing the claim and counter-claim in a single proceeding may be
more efficient than doing so in separate cases. At the same time, there are requirements that
must be met before a counter-claim may be entertained, requirements designed to prevent a
respondent from using an unrelated counter-claim simply as a tactic for slowing down the
disposition of principal claim and for detracting from a central focus on that claim.
4

In the normal course of any respondent defending against a claim, the re-

spondent will assert a factual and legal position that ‘counters’ the position of the applicant.
Advancement of that position, however, is not regarded as a ‘counter-claim’ within the meaning of Art. 80 of the Rules, and does not implicate the requirements and procedures discussed
later.7 Indeed, the relatively limited practice of counter-claims may be because the Court,
when rejecting any claim on the merits, concomitantly accepts the position of the respondent
in much the same way as it would if a closely-related counter-claim had been filed.8 A coun-

6

See Rosenne, Leiden JIL (2001), p. 87.

7

Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 145 et seq.

8

See e.g. Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1991), pp. 53,
75–6, para. 69 (3) (rejecting the applicant’s position that the award was not binding and instead

6
ter-claim only arises before the Court as part of a formal step taken by the respondent. That
step changes the possibilities of the case, for it invites the Court to issue a judgment directed
against the applicant, opening the door to a remedy against the very State that initiated the
case.9

B. Historical Development of the Counter-Claims Rule
I. Permanent Court of International Justice
5

Like the ICJ Statute, the Statute of the PCIJ did not address the issue of coun-

ter-claims. Article 40 of the 1922 Rules of Court of the PCIJ, however, envisaged the possibility of counter-claims being filed as a part of a respondent’s responsive pleading, insofar as
they ‘come within the jurisdiction of the Court’,10 but provided no particular guidance on
how such counter-claims should proceed. This initial and very cursory reference to counterclaims was not changed in the Rules of Court adopted in 1926 and 1931.11 The issue was
much further developed in Art. 63 of the 1936 Rules of the Court, which provided that counter-claims were limited to cases initiated by a unilateral application, must be filed with the
Counter-Memorial, and must be ‘directly connected’ to the subject-matter of the application.12
6

Counter-claims arose before the PCIJ in three cases.13 In Factory at Chorzów,

Poland filed a document that it titled a ‘counter-claim’. The Court regarded Poland’s submis-

finding that the award was binding and must be applied by, inter alia, the applicant).
9

Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 874 et seq.

10

Rules of Court, adopted on 24 March 1922, PCIJ, Series D, No. 2, Art. 40.

11

Guyomar, Commentaire, p. 519.

12

Rules of Court, adopted on 11 March 1936, PCIJ, Series D, third addendum to No. 2, 3rd edn., Art.
63; Guyomar, Commentaire, p. 522.

13

For an analysis of the practice of the PCIJ, see Antonopoulos (2011), pp. 37–47.

7
sion as juridically connected to Germany’s claim (indeed, the concept of ‘direct connection’
identified here influenced the later crafting of Art. 63 of the 1936 Rules), but the Court
viewed Poland’s submission as simply an effort to offset the amount of compensation that
might be paid to Germany. The Court assumed jurisdiction over Poland’s submission by virtue of its jurisdiction over Germany’s claim, but rejected the submission in the course of deciding in favour of Germany.14 It should be noted that, since the Rules of Court rather confusingly contemplated a respondent filing a ‘counter-case’, which might include ‘counterclaims’, it may not have been clear to Poland what was meant by a true counter-claim.
7

In Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Belgium filed a counter-claim, over

which the Court found (without objection from the Netherlands) that it had jurisdiction and
further found was directly connected to the Netherlands’ claim.15 Nevertheless, on the merits,
the Court rejected both the claim and counter-claim as unfounded.16 In Panevezys-Saldutiskis
Railway, Lithuania advanced a counter-claim contingent on the Court finding Estonia’s claim
admissible, which the Court did not. As such, the Court did not pass upon the counterclaim.17

II. International Court of Justice
8

The 1946 Rules of Court addressed counter-claims in Art. 63, which generally

(but not exactly) followed Art. 63 of the PCIJ Rules of Court. Three counter-claims were
filed under the 1946 formulation of the rule, all in the period 1950–1952. Norway “reserved”

14

Factory at Chorzów, Merits, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, pp. 34–9, 63–4; see Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 161 et seq.; Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 857 et seq.

15

Guyomar, Commentaire, p. 522; Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 168 et seq.

16

Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Judgment, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 70, pp. 4, 28–32.

17

Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, Judgment, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 76, pp. 4, 7–9, 22; see Guyomar,
Commentaire, p. 522.

8
a counter-claim in 1950 against the United Kingdom in Fisheries case; Peru filed a counterclaim in 1950 against Colombia in Asylum; and the United States filed a counter-claim in
1951 against France in Rights of US Nationals in Morocco.18
9

The 1972 Rules of Court renumbered the rule on counter-claims as Art. 68,

but no counter-claims were filed during the period that those rules were in force. The 1978
Rules of Court revised the text of the article on counter-claims and renumbered it as Art. 80.
Four cases filed during the time that the 1978 Rules of Court were in force resulted in the
filing of a counter-claim: Yugoslavia filed counter-claims in 1997 against Bosnia and Herzegovina in the (Bosnian) Genocide case; the United States filed a counter-claim in 1997
against Iran in Oil Platforms; Nigeria filed counter-claims in 1999 against Cameroon in Land
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria; and Uganda filed counter-claims in
2001 against the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo.
10

In 2000, the Court amended Art. 80 of the Rules to its present formulation,19

which applies to all cases submitted to the Court on or after 1 February 2001. As of 2017,
four cases have included the filing of a counter-claim under the 2000 amendment: Italy filed
a counter-claim in 2009 against Germany in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State; Serbia
filed a counter-claim in 2010 against Croatia in the (Croatian) Genocide case; Nicaragua
filed four counter-claims in 2012 against Costa Rica in Certain Activities Carried Out by
Nicaragua in the Border Area; and Colombia in 2016, Colombia filed four counter-claims
against Nicaragua in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea.
11

The different versions of the rule address similar issues, but variations in the

18

Guyomar, Commentaire, pp. 522 et seq.

19

See Rosenne, Leiden JIL (2001), pp. 83 et seq.

9
text mean that decisions reached by the Court in prior cases should be considered in the light
of the formulation of the rule on counter-claims in existence at that time. Further, some
changes in the text provide a basis for how best to interpret the rule that is currently in force.
For example, in the formulations of the rule prior to 1978, the text indicated that a counterclaim could only be made in cases that began with the filing of an application, which made
clear that a counter-claim was not envisaged for a case initiated by a joint application of two
States. The more recent formulations of the rule contain no such requirement. Though it is
likely that the filing of a joint application by two States would already encompass whatever
claims the two States wish to bring against each other, it is possible that developments in the
case subsequent to the filing of the joint application result in one of the States wishing to introduce a new ‘counter-claim’ in response to the other State’s presentation of its claim. The
change in formulation of the rule would appear to allow such a counter-claim, so long as the
other requirements of Art. 80 of the Rules are met.

C. Issues of Interpretation
12

As indicated earlier, the Court’s rule on counter-claims has changed somewhat

over time. Likewise, the application and interpretation of the rule by the Court in several cases has helped to clarify and develop the meaning of the rule. This section addresses the key
areas where the Court’s jurisprudence has shaped the regime on counter-claims.

I. Two Requirements for Entertaining the Counter-Claim
13

Article 80, para. 1 of the Rules allows the Court to entertain a ‘counter-claim’.

The Rule does not define what is meant by ‘counter-claim’ or whether that term, by itself,
imposes certain limitations upon what may be filed. In his dissenting opinion with respect to
Yugoslavia’s counter-claim in the (Bosnian) Genocide case, Judge Weeramantry insisted that
the term required that the counter-claim ‘counter’ the principal claim, rather than simply be a
parallel claim arising from circumstances linked in space and time to the principal claim. For

10
Judge Weeramantry, there ‘must be some point of intersection between the two claims, which
makes one exert an influence upon the judicial consequence of the other’. 20 The counterclaim might go further than just impinging upon or weakening the principal claim by seeking
reparation from the applicant, but it still must ‘counter’ the principal claim; a ‘claim that is
autonomous and has no bearing on the determination of the initial claim does not thus qualify
as a counter-claim’.21 In the context of that case, Yugoslavia’s counter-claim that Bosnia and
Herzegovina committed acts of genocide could not possibly diminish, off-set or weaken any
acts of genocide committed by Yugoslavia and thus, for Judge Weeramantry, Yugoslavia’s
counter-claim was incapable of ‘countering’ the principal claim.22
14

Judge Weeramantry’s view, however, was not adopted by the Court. In that

and subsequent cases, the Court has not viewed the term ‘counter-claim’ as itself embodying
particular constraints on the type of claim that may be filed with the Court. Instead, the Court
has focused on the other language of Art. 80, para. 1 of the Rules, which provides that the
Court may entertain a counter-claim ‘only if’ two requirements are met: when the counterclaim ‘comes within the jurisdiction of the Court’ and when the counter-claim is ‘directly
connected with the subject matter of the claim of the other party’. The Court has characterized these two requirements both as requirements on the ‘admissibility of a counter-claim as
such’, explaining that admissibility ‘in this context must be understood broadly to encompass
both the jurisdictional requirement and the direct-connection requirement’.23

20

Bosnian Genocide case, Diss. Op. Weeramantry, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 287, 289.

21

Ibid., p. 291.

22

Ibid., pp. 292–4; see Thirlway, ICJ Law and Procedure (2013), p. 1011; Quintana, ICJ Litigation,
pp. 809-10.

23

Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims,

Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 19; see also Oil Platforms, Counter-Claim,

11
15

The reason for the first requirement, relating to jurisdiction, is to preclude the

respondent from using the counter-claim ‘as a means of referring to an international court
claims which exceed the limits of its jurisdiction as recognized by the parties’. 24 The reason
for the second requirement, relating to ‘direct connection’, is to preclude the respondent from
using the counter-claim as a means ‘to impose on the Applicant any claim it chooses, at the
risk of infringing the Applicant’s rights and of compromising the proper administration of
justice’.25
16

The use of ‘may entertain’ rather than ‘shall entertain’ makes clear that ac-

ceptance of the counter-claim as a part of the case, even if the counter-claim meets these two
requirements, is wholly within the discretion of the Court; it still remains open for the Court
to decline to address the counter-claim within the proceedings.26 To date, the Court has not
exercised such discretion; in each instance where it has found both requirements to have been
met, the Court has allowed the counter-claim to proceed as part of the case.
17

The use of the word ‘only’ makes clear that, if either of the two requirements

is not satisfied, the Court should not entertain the counter-claim. Thus, the requirements are

Order of 10 March 1998, ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 190, 203, para. 33; Armed Activities (DRC v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, ICJ Reports (2001), pp. 660, 678, para. 35; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), pp. 310,
315-6, para. 14; Border Area/Construction of a Road, Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, ICJ
Reports (2013), pp. 200, 208, para. 20.
24

Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243,
257–8, para. 31.

25

Ibid.

26

See Shaw, Rosenne’s Law and Practice, vol. III, p. 1271; but see Antonopoulos (2011), p. 74.
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“cumulative” in nature; both must be satisfied for the counter-claim to be found admissible.27
Even if the applicant does not object to the counter-claim, it appears that the Court must still
consider whether the counter-claim meets these two requirements. Thus, in the (Croatian)
Genocide case, although Croatia indicated that it did not intend to raise objections to the admissibility of Serbia’s counter-claims, that alone did not dispose of the matter. Rather, the
Court simply stated that it ‘does not consider that it is required to rule definitively at this
stage on the question of whether the said claims fulfil the conditions set forth in Article 80,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court’.28 In its practice to date, whenever the Court has found
that one or other of the requirements has not been met, it has declined to allow the counterclaim to become a part of the case before it.
18

In the formulations of the rule prior to 2000, the two key requirements for the

filing of a counter-claim—that it falls within the jurisdiction of the Court and that it is directly connected with the subject-matter of the principal claim—were reversed. Nevertheless, in
the cases before the Court that arose under the prior formulation of the rule, the Court first
determined whether it had jurisdiction over the counter-claim before proceeding to the issue
of the connection with the principal claim. The order of the requirements in the current formulation arguably places somewhat greater emphasis on need for the counter-claim to fall
within the jurisdiction of the Court; in the event that it does not, the question of whether it is
directly connected to the principal claim becomes irrelevant. Nevertheless, the Court is free
to analyse the two requirements in whatever sequence it wishes; for example, in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, the Court addressed

27

Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims,

Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 20.
28

Croatian Genocide case, Order of 4 February 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), pp. 3, 6 (emphasis added).

13
the requirement of direct connection prior to addressing the requirement of jurisdiction. 29

II. Jurisdiction Over the Counter-Claim ‘As Such’
19

As indicated earlier, para. 1 of Art. 80 of the Rules provides that the counter-

claim may be entertained only if it ‘comes within the jurisdiction of the Court’.
20

To the extent that the applicant fails to object to the Court’s jurisdiction over

the counter-claim at any point in the proceeding, the Court typically finds that jurisdiction
exists with little if any discussion.30 Thus, in Rights of US Nationals in Morocco, France invoked the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to obtain a finding that a treaty concluded
between the United States and the Emperor of Morocco in September 1936 provided only for
exemptions from local jurisdiction for US nationals in Morocco in certain limited, specified
cases. In its Counter-Memorial, the United States maintained by means of a counter-claim
that it was entitled to more extensive benefits. In its reply, France contested the merits of the
US position, but did not object to the jurisdiction of the Court over the US counter-claim. The
Court proceeded to deal with the counter-claim without any discussion of jurisdiction (or, for
that matter, the connectivity of the counter-claim to the claim).31 Similarly, when Nigeria
filed its counter-claim against Cameroon, the latter indicated no objection of any kind, and
the Court found without discussion that jurisdiction existed.32

29

See Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-

Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 20 (the Court “is not bound by the
sequence set out in” Article 80).
30

Murphy, Geo. Wash. Univ. Int’l L. Rev. (2000–2001), p. 17.

31

U.S. Nationals in Morocco, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1952), pp. 176, 203–12; see Guyomar, Commentaire, p. 524.

32

Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Order of 30 June 1999, ICJ Reports
(1999), pp. 983, 985.

14
21

The applicant might object to the admissibility of the counter-claim for rea-

sons other than jurisdiction. Thus, in the (Bosnian) Genocide case, Bosnia and Herzegovina
invoked the compromissory clause of the Genocide Convention against Yugoslavia to advance its claim that Yugoslavia had committed acts of genocide in violation of the Convention. Yugoslavia invoked the same basis of jurisdiction to advance its counter-claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina had committed acts of genocide. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina
objected to the connection of the counter-claim to the principal claim, it did not object to the
Court’s jurisdiction over the counter-claim. In the course of finding the counter-claim admissible, the Court simply noted the lack of any jurisdictional objection. 33 Likewise, in the context of a claim by the DRC based upon the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, the DRC objected to the admissibility of Uganda’s counter-claim on the issue of connectivity, but not with
respect to jurisdiction.34 The Court noted that the DRC ‘does not deny that Uganda’s claims
fulfil the “jurisdictional” condition’35 and proceeded to address solely the issue of connectivity in disposing of the DRC’s objection.
22

The applicant might object to the Court’s jurisdiction, but only with respect to

some aspects of the counter-claim. In Asylum, Peru advanced a counter-claim to the effect
that Colombia acted unlawfully under the 1928 Convention on Asylum by granting asylum to
Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. The Court’s jurisdiction over the counter-claim as originally
formulated was not challenged by Colombia and the Court proceeded based on an assumption

33

Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243,
258, para. 32.

34

Armed Activities case (DRC v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, ICJ Reports
(2001), pp. 660, 666, para. 8.

35

Ibid., p. 677, para. 30.

15
that jurisdiction existed.36 At the oral hearing in October 1950, however, Peru amended the
counter-claim to include that ‘the maintenance of the asylum constitutes at the present time a
violation of’ the 1928 Convention’. Colombia did object to the Court’s jurisdiction over this
addition, but given the Court’s ultimate disposition of the principal claim in favour of Colombia, the Court found it superfluous to address the jurisdictional objection.37
23

The applicant might also object to the Court’s jurisdiction over the entire

counter-claim. In the Jurisdictional Immunities case, Italy sought to ground the Court’s jurisdiction over the counter-claim upon the 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Article 27 (a) of the Convention stated that its provisions did not apply to
facts or situations arising prior to the Convention’s entry into force. Because Italy’s counterclaim appeared to concern facts and situations that pre-dated the Convention (harm to Italians
committed by Nazi Germany between 1943 and 1945, and the waiver of claims contained in
the 1947 Peace Treaty), Germany maintained that Italy’s counter-claim fell outside the scope
of the Court’s jurisdiction. Italy sought to argue that its counter-claim actually concerned
inadequate and incomplete efforts at reparation beginning with two 1961 Settlement Agreements and continuing to recent years. The Court, however, agreed with Germany that such
later developments were not ‘new’ situations post-dating the entry into force of the Convention; rather, they simply concerned the existence and scope of a German obligation to make
reparation for violations that had occurred at a much earlier time. 38 Therefore the Court had
no jurisdiction over the counter-claim and it was inadmissible.
24

An interesting temporal question arises if the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction

36

Asylum, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1950), pp. 266, 280.

37

Ibid., p. 288; see Guyomar, Commentaire, pp. 521 et seq.

38

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case, Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, pp. 9–10, paras.
26–31.

16
over the principal claim disappears between the time that the case is filed and the time that
the counter-claim is filed. In Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in
the Caribbean Sea, Nicaragua filed its application in 2013, invoking as the basis of the
Court’s jurisdiction the 1948 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá). Based
on a denunciation by Colombia, the Pact subsequently terminated as between Nicaragua and
Colombia. In March 2016, the Court found that it had jurisdiction over the case, since that
Pact was still in force as of the date that the case was filed. In November 2016, Colombia
filed counter-claims against Nicaragua. In rejecting Nicaragua’s argument that the Court had
no jurisdiction over the counter-claims because they were filed after the termination of the
Pact as between Nicaragua and Colombia, the Court stated that once “the Court has established jurisdiction to entertain a case, it has jurisdiction to deal with all its phases; the subsequent lapse of the title cannot deprive the Court of its jurisdiction”.39 In this instance, “the
lapse of the jurisdictional title invoked by an applicant in support of its claims, subsequent to
the filing of the application, does not deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to entertain counterclaims filed on the same jurisdictional basis”.40 While generally agreeing with this proposition, Judge Donoghue wrote separately to argue that the lapse of jurisdictional title necessitated a further inquiry (which the Court did not undertake), which is whether the counterclaims “fit within the subject-matter” of the dispute presented in Nicaragua’s application (a
narrower standard than whether the counter-claim was directly connected with the subjectmatter of the principal claim).41
25

39

Article 80, para. 1 of the Rules does not require, by its terms, that the counter-

Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims,

Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 67.
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Ibid., Sep. Op. Donoghue.
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claim should have exactly the same jurisdictional basis as that upon which the principal claim
arises.42 As such, the text arguably leaves open the possibility that, e.g., in a case brought
based on the Court’s jurisdiction under the compromissory clause of a treaty to interpret one
provision of that treaty, the counter-claim might be based upon the Court’s jurisdiction to
interpret a different provision of the same treaty. Further, in theory, the counter-claim might
be based upon the Court’s jurisdiction under a compromissory clause of an entirely different
treaty, or upon an entirely different type of jurisdiction, such as invocation of the Court’s
compulsory jurisdiction.43
26

In the Oil Platforms case, however, there is some suggestion that the jurisdic-

tional basis available for a counter-claim might be limited to the existing jurisdiction over the
principal claim. In that case, the Court’s jurisdiction over Iran’s claim was restricted by the
Court, at the jurisdiction phase of the case, solely to the interpretation of Art. X, para. 1, of
the 1955 US-Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights. 44 That paragraph provides that ‘Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be
freedom of commerce and navigation’, whereas the other paragraphs of Art. X deal with various rights and privileges of vessels of the two parties. When the United States then filed its
Counter-Memorial, it included a counter-claim concerning alleged Iranian attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf, as well as the laying of mines and other military actions, in violation
of Art. X as a whole, not just para. 1 of that article. Iran objected to the Court’s jurisdiction
over the counter-claim, asserting in part that the United States ‘seeks to widen the dispute to
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See Thirlway, Leiden JIL (1999), pp. 203 et seq.; Antonopoulos (2011), pp. 74–80.
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Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 161 et seq.; Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 868
et seq.

44

Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, Preliminary Objection, ICJ Reports (1996), pp. 803, 821, para.
55.
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provisions of the Treaty of Amity … which were never in question in the proceedings’. 45 In
response, the United States argued that the Court, under the 1978 formulation of the rule,
should not reach the issue of jurisdiction at the preliminary stage; instead the only matter
properly at issue under Art. 80 of the Rules was whether there was doubt that the counterclaim was directly connected to the principal claim.
27

In its Order on the counter-claim, the Court did not limit itself to the issue of

connectivity; it squarely addressed the issue of jurisdiction ‘as such’ over the counter-claim.
The Court first noted that, in its prior judgment on jurisdiction over Iran’s principal claim, it
found that Art. X, para. 1, protected not just the immediate sale of goods, but also ancillary
activities integrally related to such commerce.46 Then, the Court found that the activities at
issue in the counter-claim ‘are capable of falling within the scope of Article X, paragraph 1’
and therefore ‘the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the United States counter-claim in so far
as the facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X, paragraph
1’.47 In the dispositif, the Court then found that the counter-claim was ‘admissible as such and
forms part of the current proceedings’.48
28

In so doing, the Court may have limited the counter-claim to alleged violations

arising under only Art. X, para. 1, not Art. X as a whole. If so, however, the Court did not
explain exactly why the counter-claim was to be so limited, a step criticized by Judge Higgins
in her separate opinion. According to Higgins:
In the first place, findings that reject the contentions of a party should be based on reasons. The disturbing tendency to offer conclusions but not reasons is not to be welcomed.
45

Ibid., Counter-Claims, ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 190, 196, para.12.
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In the second place, the inarticulate assumption that the jurisdictional basis established
for a claim necessarily is the only jurisdictional basis for, and sets the limits to, a counterclaim, is open to challenge.
…

There is nothing in the Rules or practice of the Court to suggest that the very identical jurisdictional nexus must be established by a counter-claimant. The travaux préparatoires
to the various formulations of what is now Article 80 of the Rules contain no suggestion
whatever that this was thought of as a requirement. The rule on counter-claims has gone
through successive changes. But neither in the discussions of 1922, nor of 1934, 1935,
1936, nor again of 1946, 1968, 1970, 1972, does this thought anywhere appear.49
…

Nor does the wording of Article 80, paragraph 1 of the Rules suggest this. It requires that
a counter-claim ‘comes within the jurisdiction of the Court’, not that it ‘was within the
jurisdiction established by the Court in respect of the claims of the applicant’.50
29

If Judge Higgins’ interpretation of what the Court did is correct, then a coun-

ter-claim that is based upon a legal provision different from that upon which the principal
claim is based may encounter difficulty, at least in circumstances where the Court has already
passed upon and limited the scope of the principal claim. Such an approach would no doubt
be influenced by the second admissibility requirement (discussed later, in 33–56), which is
that the counter-claim must be directly connected with the subject-matter of the principal
49

Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 145 et seq.; Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 859
et seq.
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Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, Sep. Op. Higgins, ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 217, 218–9.
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claim. In many instances, the ‘connectivity’ issue may also require a close relationship between the jurisdiction of the principal claim and the jurisdiction of the counter-claim.
30

However, it is not actually clear that the Court limited the US counter-claim to

Art. X, para. 1 of the 1955 Treaty. During the subsequent merits phase, Iran remained concerned that portions of Art. X other than para. 1 were still part of the counter-claim, and
hence objected that any portion of the counter-claim based upon those paragraphs should be
regarded as inadmissible.51 In addressing Iran’s objection the Court, in its 2003 judgment on
the merits, did not assert that it had decided that the US counter-claim was limited to Art. X,
para. 1. Instead, the Court noted that the United States itself, in the submissions filed with its
rejoinder, ‘substantially narrowed the basis of its counter-claim’ by only referring to Art. X,
para. 1, thereby depriving Iran’s objection ‘of any object’.52 In other words, the Court’s ultimate judgment strongly suggests that the 1998 Order of the Court did not restrict the counterclaim to Art. X, para. 1; that ‘narrowing’ only happened in March 2001 by the conduct of the
United States itself when filing its rejoinder.
31

In any event, in situations where the Court first finds that the jurisdictional re-

quirement has not been met, it refrains from moving on to the next requirement concerning
direct connection of the counter-claim with the subject-matter of the claim.53 If the Court
finds that the jurisdictional requirement has been met, it proceeds to the next requirement.
32

Importantly, a finding in favour of jurisdiction for purposes of Art. 80 of the

Rules does not definitively resolve the Court’s jurisdiction over the counter-claim. The Court
uses language in its Order to the effect that it has found admissibility under Art. 80 of the
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Rules ‘as such’,54 by which it appears to mean that, on the facts as pled by the respondent, the
counter-claim appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. Further, the Court includes
language that the Order ‘in no way prejudges any question with which the Court would have
to deal during the remainder of the proceedings’.55 Although the Court has not characterized
this approach to jurisdiction under Art. 80 of the Rules as a form of prima facie jurisdiction,
akin to that used in the context of proceedings on interim measures of protection, it would
appear to operate in much the same way. As discussed later, in MN 75–78, the applicant remains able, as the ‘Merits’ phase of the case unfolds, to revisit the issue of jurisdiction in the
context of all the facts and law developed during that phase, and to demonstrate to the Court
that jurisdiction does not actually exist over the counter-claim.

III. Direct Connection with the Subject-Matter of the Claim
33

Paragraph 1 of Art. 80 of the Rules also provides that the counter-claim may

be entertained only if it ‘is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other
party’.56 Art. 80 of the Rules provides no guidance as to how such a connection is to be assessed and application of this requirement appears to be more of an art than a rigid science.
Indeed, signalling its considerable latitude when applying the requirement, the Court has
stressed that ‘it is for the Court, in its sole discretion, to assess whether the counter-claim is
sufficiently connected to the principal claim, taking into account the particular aspects of
each case’.57
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34

In the event that no objection is made to the connection of the counter-claim to

the claim, the Court nevertheless itself examines such connectivity. Thus, in the Land and Maritime Boundary case, Cameroon did not object to Nigeria’s counter-claim, but the Court still
discussed and determined that a connection existed.58 In that instance, the Court was confronted
with Cameroon’s claim that Nigeria had unlawfully occupied Cameroon’s territory in the Bakassi Peninsula and with Nigeria’s counter-claims that Cameroon had engaged in unlawful incursions into Nigerian territory along the same land border. The Court determined that Nigeria’s counter-claims were ‘directly connected’ since they:
rest on facts of the same nature as the corresponding claims of Cameroon, and … all of
those facts are alleged to have occurred along the frontier between the two States; … the
claims in question of each of the Parties pursue the same legal aim, namely the establishment of legal responsibility and the determination of the reparation due on this account … 59
35

If the respondent does object due to the lack of a ‘direct connection’ between

the principal claim and the counter-claim, the Court may readily dismiss that objection, as

258, para. 33; Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and Construction of
a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River, Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, ICJ Reports (2013), pp. 200, 211-12, para. 32; Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para.
22; see also Salerno, RGDIP (1999), pp. 360 et seq.; Kolb, ICJ, pp. 670-3; Quintana, ICJ Litigation, pp. 814-21.
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985.

59

Ibid.

23
occurred in the Asylum case.60 In that case, Colombia’s principal claim concerned Peru’s alleged obligation to allow for safe conduct of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Peru’s counterclaim alleged that the asylum was not lawful under the Convention. Colombia challenged the
admissibility of the counter-claim, arguing that it was not directly connected with the subjectmatter of the Application. The Court rejected the objection, stating:
It emerges clearly from the arguments of the Parties that the second submission of the
Government of Colombia, which concerns the demand for a safe conduct, rests largely on
the alleged regularity of the asylum, which is precisely what is disputed by the counterclaim. The connexion is so direct that certain conditions which are required to exist before a safe-conduct can be demanded depend precisely on facts which are raised by the
counter-claim. The direct connexion being thus clearly established, the sole objection to
the admissibility of the counter-claim in its original form is therefore removed.61
36

Yet in other instances, the counter-claim may not be essentially an inescapable

component or ‘flip side’ of the principal claim, in which case the Court must weigh the two
Parties’ differing views as to what it is about the two claims that must ‘connect’ and how
‘direct’ the connection must be. The rule does not indicate whether the assessment of the
‘connection’ concerns facts, concerns law, or concerns some combination of the two. Issues
of admissibility before the Court typically depend on facts62 not law, but in its jurisprudence
on counter-claims, the Court has said that the existence of the ‘direct connection’ must be
considered ‘both in fact and in law’, and with regard to whether the parties are pursuing the
same ‘legal aims’.63
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As is the case for understanding the meaning of ‘counter-claim’ (as discussed

previously in MN 13), the Court does not approach the ‘connection’ requirement as requiring
that the counter-claim seek to diminish, off-set, or neutralize the principal claim. Some counter-claims may have that effect, but the lack of that element does not defeat the requisite connection to the principal claim. For example, in the Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), the
Court rejected the DRC’s position that the arguments supporting the counter-claim ‘must
both support the counter-claim and be pertinent for the purposes of rebutting the principal
claim’.64
38

Further, the factual ‘connection’ or ‘complex’ for comparing the principal

claim and the counter-claim, as seen in the decisions of the Court, does not require that the
underlying facts of the two claims be identical.65 Indeed, in most situations, the facts supporting the claim and the counter-claim are not the same, but they are related. For the Court, that
relationship appears to turn upon two key factors: the period of time during which the conduct at issue occurred and its geographical location.66 The period of time of the conduct at
issue in the two claims need not be exactly the same; conduct relating to one claim might
span a longer time period than the other. The geographical location also need not be exactly
the same; the conduct at issue in the counter-claim might occur in a place not at issue in the
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principal claim.67 Nevertheless, a relationship in time and space does need to exist. The ‘legal
connection’ seems to turn on two further factors: the legal and non-legal instruments at issue,
and the overall objective of addressing a particular legal relationship between the parties. 68 In
most instances, it seems important whether the conventional or customary law at issue with
respect to both claims is largely or exclusively the same; invocation of an entirely new instrument in the counter-claim as having been violated may be a basis for denying a sufficient
connection of that part of the counter-claim.
39

The standard is best understood as applied by the Court in specific cases. In

the (Bosnian) Genocide case, Bosnia and Herzegovina filed a claim that concerned allegations of wide-ranging conduct in the early 1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Yugoslavia,
including ‘ethnic cleansing’, summary execution, bombardment of the civilian population,
destruction of property, and other acts that constituted or related to genocide, all directed at
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s non-Serb population. In its Counter-Memorial, Yugoslavia advanced a counter-claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible in the same time period
in Bosnia and Herzegovina for comparable acts of genocide, this time directed at Bosnian
Serbs. Both the claim and counter-claim, therefore, involved conduct in the same place (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and in the same time frame (the early 1990s) that allegedly violated the
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same treaty (the Genocide Convention).
40

Bosnia and Herzegovina nevertheless objected to the admissibility of Yugo-

slavia’s counter-claim as not ‘directly connected’ to the principal claim, maintaining that the
facts at issue in the counter-claim were ‘totally different’ from those of the principal claim,
and that the examination of one set of facts ‘would be of no help in the judicial analysis of the
other set and could not affect its outcome in any way whatsoever’. 69 Moreover, as a legal
matter, Bosnia and Herzegovina argued that erga omnes rights at issue in the Genocide Convention are inherently non-reciprocal in nature; there is nothing about the adherence or lack
of adherence by one Party to the Convention that has any bearing on the obligations of a different Party.70 Bosnia and Herzegovina insisted that connectivity required some element of
‘countering’ the principal claim by reducing or neutralizing its effects.71
41

For its part, Yugoslavia maintained that there was no requirement that the ex-

act same facts be at issue.72 Further, Yugoslavia noted that both claims were based upon the
same treaty and the same general rules of state responsibility, and that the facts of both concerned ‘the same tragic conflict, i.e., civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which happened in
a single territorial and temporal setting, based on the same historical background and within
the framework of the same political development’.73 Moreover, Yugoslavia maintained that
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analysing the facts of the counter-claim was ‘of crucial importance to answer the question of
attribution to the Respondents of acts alleged by the Applicant’, since in some instances the
identical facts were at issue with respect to allegations arising under both claims. 74 Finally,
since a violation of the Convention involved assessing the intent of the underlying conduct,
Yugoslavia argued that understanding the facts associated with the counter-claim was essential for understanding Yugoslavia’s intent in taking certain actions at certain times.75
42

The Court rejected Bosnia and Herzegovina’s position and found the ‘direct

connection’ requirement to have been met. With respect to the facts, the Court stated:
in the present case, it emerges from the Parties’ submissions that their respective claims
rest on facts of the same nature; … they form part of the same factual complex since all
those facts are alleged to have occurred on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
during the same time period; and … Yugoslavia states, moreover, that it intends to rely
on certain identical facts in order to refute the allegations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
to obtain judgment against that State.76
43

Hence, the concept of a ‘factual complex’ appears fairly broad in nature, capa-

ble of encompassing alleged conduct by one State against another State’s nationals in that
other State (here, the principal claim) and alleged conduct by that other State in its own territory against its own nationals (here the counter-claim).
44

With respect to the law, the Court in the (Bosnian) Genocide case accepted

that the erga omnes obligations at issue meant that one party’s breach could not possibly excuse that of the other party, but even so:
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the absence of reciprocity in the scheme of the Convention is not determinative as regards the assessment of whether there is a legal connection between the principal claim
and the counter-claim, in so far the two Parties pursue, with their respective claims, the
same legal aim, namely the establishment of legal responsibility for violations of the
Genocide Convention.77
45

The Court also noted that in its order on interim measures of protection, it had

called upon both States, not just Yugoslavia, to adhere to their obligations under the Genocide Convention,78 thus suggesting that there was a connection between the conduct of both
parties with respect to the underlying dispute. When Serbia years later presented a similar set
of facts in support of its counter-claim against Croatia (albeit this time with respect to the
Krajina region of Croatia), Croatia did not contest the connection between the counter-claim
and the claim.79
46

The issue of connectivity was also addressed in detail in the Oil Platforms

case, decided just four months after the (Bosnian) Genocide case. Iran’s principal claim concerned US attacks on three Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf in 1987–1988, in violation of Art. X, para. 1, of the 1955 US-Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, which provides that ‘Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties
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there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation’.80
47

The US counter-claim was not focused on the oil platforms but, instead, on

Iranian small-boat attacks and mine-laying that harmed US and other vessels in the Persian
Gulf in the same period (the United States alleged that some gunboats were launched from
Iran’s oil platforms). The United States identified seven specific incidents in 1987–1988 involving such attacks or mine-laying, but reserved the ability to add further incidents as the
proceedings progressed.81 Iran contended that there was no direct connection between the
counter-claim and the principal claim. As a factual link, according to Iran, the United States
did not attack the three oil platforms because of the seven alleged Iranian attacks. As a legal
link, six of the seven incidents did not involve vessels engaged in commerce or navigation
‘between’ the two countries (e.g. some of the attacks were against US military vessels), while
the seventh incident did not involve a US-flagged vessel for which the United States was entitled to advance a claim.82 The United States contested those views, but further argued that
Iran’s attacks generally had an effect on shipping protected by Art. X by creating threatening
conditions for all merchant vessels operating in the Gulf, and that the US attacks on the platforms in response to Iran’s threatening actions was at the heart of its defence against the principal claim.83
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The Court found that the necessary connection existed, stating:

it emerges from the Parties’ submissions that their claims rest on facts of the same nature;
… they form part of the same factual complex since the facts relied on—whether involving the destruction of oil platforms or of ships—are alleged to have occurred in the Gulf
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during the same period; … the United States indicates, moreover, that it intends to rely
on the same facts and circumstances in order both to refute the allegations of Iran and to
obtain judgment against that State; and … , with their respective claims, the two Parties
pursue the same legal aim, namely the establishment of legal responsibility for violations
of the 1955 Treaty.84
49

In the Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), the DRC’s claim concerned a se-

ries of alleged acts by Uganda that constituted armed aggression (including incursions into
and occupation of DRC territory, and support of irregular forces in the DRC), violation of the
laws of war, and the unlawful downing of a civilian aircraft. Uganda’s counter-claim alleged
that the DRC had engaged in unlawful acts against Uganda, which the Court approached as
falling into three categories: (1) alleged DRC acts of aggression against Uganda; (2) alleged
DRC attacks upon Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel in the DRC’s capital, Kinshasa, as well as upon Ugandan nationals located there; and (3) alleged DRC violations of the
Lusaka Agreement of July 1999, which had attempted to end the armed conflict that had broken out among eight African nations in 1998.85
50

With respect to the first category, the Court found that a direct connection ex-

isted. The Court found that the parties’ ‘respective claims relate to facts of the same nature,
namely the use of force and support allegedly provided to armed groups’, and that temporally
both claims ‘concern a conflict in existence between the two neighboring States’ since 1994
(even though Uganda’s counter-claim ranged over a longer period than did the principal
claim).86 With regard to the legal connection, the Court noted that ‘each Party seeks to establish the other’s responsibility based on the violation of the principle of the non-use of force’
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in Art. 2, para. 4 of the UN Charter and in customary international law, as well as the principle of non-intervention; hence the parties were ‘pursuing the same legal aims’.87
51

With respect to the second category, the Court reached a similar conclusion,

even though the conduct at issue in the counter-claim (attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel, and on non-diplomatic persons in Kinshasa) was not in the same geographical region as the conduct at issue in the principal claim. Here the Court focused more
on the temporal dimension of those attacks having allegedly occurred at the same time (August 1998) as the alleged Ugandan invasion of the DRC, which therefore placed them in the
same factual complex88 (the unstated assumption being that the alleged attacks were a response to that alleged invasion). Further, the Court noted that both parties were invoking
rules on state responsibility and on the protection of persons and property, which demonstrated that they were ‘pursuing the same legal aims’.89 Ad hoc Judge Verhoeven voted against the
Court’s decision, saying that the alleged attack on the diplomatic persons and property in
Kinshasa:
does not appear to me to throw any useful light for the Court on the armed aggression
and unlawful occupation of part of its territory for which the Democratic Republic of the
Congo claims to have suffered … . the mere fact that this attack is part of a multifaceted
history of conflict is not sufficient to justify the Respondent being authorized to seise the
Court of this claim by way of counter-claim.90
52

The Court did not find the requisite connection with respect to the third cate-

gory of Uganda’s counter-claims, since the alleged violation of the Lusaka Agreement con87
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cerned matters of dispute resolution, which was not within the subject-matter of the principal
claim. According to the Court, this part of Uganda’s counter-claims referred:
to the Congolese national dialogue, to the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and to the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups … [and] these questions, which relate to methods for solving the conflict in the region agreed at [a] multilateral level in a ceasefire accord … , concern facts of a different nature from those relied on in the Congo’s claims,
which relate to acts for which Uganda was allegedly responsible during that conflict …91
Hence, the Court found that this part of Uganda’s counter-claim was not part of the ‘factual
complex’ of the principal claim. Further, this part of the counter-claim concerned an alleged
violation of legal rules (in the Lusaka Agreement) that were not presented in the DRC’s
claim, such that the parties were not pursuing the same legal aims with respect to this issue.92
53

In Border Area/Construction of a Road, the Court held that two of Nicara-

gua’s counter-claims had no direct connection with Costa Rica’s claims in either fact or law,
and were therefore inadmissible. Costa Rica’s claims concerned an alleged incursion into,
occupation of, and use by Nicaragua’s army of Costa Rican territory, specifically concerning
actions in Isla Portillos and dredging operations on the San Juan River. Nicaragua’s second
counter-claim asked the Court to declare that it ‘has become the sole sovereign over the area
formerly occupied by the Bay of San Juan del Norte.’ The Court found that this counter-claim
was not directly connected to Costa Rica’s claim as a matter of fact (the geographical and
temporal points of reference were different)93 or as a matter of law (Costa Rica’s claim con91
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cerned breaches of sovereignty, of international environmental law, and of an 1858 treaty,
while the counter-claim concerned acquisition of sovereignty as a result of circumstances that
had evolved since 1858).94 Nicaragua’s third counter-claim requested the Court to find that
Nicaragua had a right to free navigation on a portion of the San Juan River. Although the
geographical and temporal links here were closer (the claims related to a common river system and the right to navigate was allegedly ‘revived’ by Costa Rica’s resistance to Nicaragua’s dredging), the Court still found that the facts underpinning the claims and counterclaim were ‘of a different nature’ and that the legal issues were not directly connected.95
54

In Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Carib-

bean Sea, the Court found no direct connection between two of Colombia’s counter-claims
due to both facts and law. With respect to facts, Colombia’s counter-claims were focused on
an alleged failure to protect and preserve the marine environment, particularly through actions of private Nicaraguan vessels, whereas Nicaragua’s principal claims were based on actions of Colombia’s Navy in allegedly interfering with and violations of Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its exclusive economic zone.96 Similarly, with respect to law,
Colombia’s counter-claims were based on customary international law (and international instruments) relating to protection of the environment, whereas Nicaragua’s principal claims
concerned customary international law of the sea relating to the rights, jurisdiction and duties
of the coastal State.97 By contrast, a Colombian counter-claim focused on the conduct, rights
and obligations of Nicaragua’s Navy in Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone was found di-
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rectly connected to the Nicaragua’s principal claims.98 Likewise, the Court found a direct
connection between a Nicaraguan claim and a Colombian counter-claim that alleged violation
of sovereign rights through the adoption by the other Party of a domestic legal instrument
fixing the limits of their respective maritime zones in the same geographical area.99
55

If the Court finds there is no direct connection between the counter-claim (or

portions thereof) and the principal claim, there is no indication in Art. 80 of the Rules as to
what procedure the Court should then follow. In theory, the Court’s discretion might include
ordering that the counter-claim will henceforth be treated as a separate case on the Court’s
docket, though doing so would be an unusually robust exercise of the Court’s discretion. In
any event, the practice of the Court to date, once it finds no direct connection, has simply
been to decline to entertain the counter-claim as a part of the case before the Court.
56

Doing so leaves the respondent free to initiate an entirely new case before the

Court against the other State based on the subject-matter of the erstwhile counter-claim. Indeed, Art. 63 of the 1936 Rules of Court expressly stated as much, saying: ‘Any claim which
is not directly connected with the subject of the original application must be put forward by
means of a separate application and may form the subject of distinct proceedings or be joined
by the Court to the original proceedings.’ To date, however, no State that has advanced a
counter-claim unsuccessfully has exercised this option. If such a new case were filed, there
would appear to be two possibilities for how the Court could proceed, as signalled in the
1936 formulation. The Court could address the two cases in separate proceedings, or could
formally or informally join the two cases in a single proceeding, pursuant to Art. 47 of the
Rules of Court. If the latter were to occur, and if the Court determined that it had jurisdiction
over the new case, then the two claims would proceed in a fashion very similar to what would
98

Ibid., paras. 44-46.

99

Ibid., para. 52-54.

35
have otherwise occurred if the counter-claim had been admissible in the first proceeding.100

IV. Filing the Counter-Claim with the Counter-Memorial
57

Paragraph 2 of Art. 80 of the Rules provides that the ‘counter-claim shall be

made in the Counter-Memorial and shall appear as part of the submissions of that party’.101
Since Art. 80 of the Rules is located in the portion of the Rules of Court that deals with incidental proceedings, it is generally accepted that the reference here is to the Counter-Memorial
filed on the merits of the principal claim, not a Counter-Memorial addressed to jurisdiction or
admissibility. Thus, the expectation is that, after an application is filed, any objections by the
respondent to jurisdiction or admissibility of the principal claim would first be addressed by
the Court (a process which is especially likely since those objections must be raised no later
than three months after the filing of the Memorial, regardless of when the Counter-Memorial
is scheduled thereafter to be filed). Only if the Court decides against those objections is the
respondent expected to file its Counter-Memorial on the merits, at which point it must file at
the same time any counter-claim.102 The rule does not permit filing of the counter-claim at
either an earlier or later stage in the proceedings nor does it apparently permit the submission
of a counter-claim orally. Moreover, the rule does not permit the filing of a ‘counter-counterclaim’ by the applicant, a step not attempted in any case filed to date before the Court.
58

In some instances, in the course of filing preliminary objections on jurisdiction

or admissibility, a respondent has included a reservation to the effect that, if such objections
are not sustained, the respondent may decide to file a counter-claim at the merits stage.
Though not required by the Rules of Court, such a reservation is an understandable precaution and, in any event, signals to the Court the intention of the respondent in the event that the
100
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case moves forward.
59

Once a counter-claim has been filed in conjunction with the Counter-

Memorial and has been found admissible, Art. 80 of the Rules does not address whether it
should be notified to all States entitled to appear before the Court (as is done when an application initiating a case is filed with the Court, pursuant to Art. 40, para. 3 of the Statute of the
Court).103 In the initial cases involving counter-claims before the International Court (Asylum
and Rights of US Nationals in Morocco), no such notification appears to have occurred. Nevertheless, since the decision on admissibility of the counter-claim in the (Bosnian) Genocide
case, a practice has developed whereby the Court instructs the Registrar of the Court to
transmit a copy of the Court’s Order on admissibility to those States, 104 or its Order scheduling further pleadings in the event that admissibility is not challenged. 105 Doing so is an appropriate step, inter alia, to ensure that any State that believes it has interests at stake in the
Court’s adjudication of the counter-claim may seek to intervene in the proceeding, pursuant
to Arts. 62 or 63 of the Court’s Statute.106 Even so, the Court does not transmit along with its
Order the portion of the Counter-Memorial advancing the counter-claim, so third States are
left to assess the nature of the counter-claim from the Court’s Order alone.107
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V. Counter-Claim as an Independent Claim and Not a Defence
60

Once the counter-claim is permitted, the language of Art. 80 of the Rules

strongly indicates that the counter-claim operates as an independent claim, neither as a defence to the principal claim nor as a claim dependent on the principal claim. 108 Both paras. 1
and 2 of Art. 80 of the Rules refer to the applicant as simply the ‘other party’ to the counterclaim; it is no longer exclusively the ‘Applicant’ in the proceeding. In the event that the principal claim fails on the merits, or is withdrawn, there is no direct effect upon the counterclaim, which will stand or fall on its own merits.
61

In the (Bosnian) Genocide case, the Court confirmed that, although the coun-

ter-claim is a reaction to the principal claim, ‘a counter-claim is independent of the principal
claim in so far as it constitutes a separate “claim”, that is to say an autonomous legal act the
object of which is to submit a new claim to the Court’.109 Further, the counter-claim widens
‘the original subject-matter of the dispute by pursuing objectives other than the mere dismissal
of the claim of the Applicant in the main proceedings’, and thus is ‘distinguishable from a
defence on the merits’.110 In the normal course of events, this means that a counter-claim (unlike a defence) will identify a violation of international law for which the other party is responsible and will seek reparation from the Court for that violation.111 If it does not serve this
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function, then it will not be regarded as a ‘counter-claim.’ Hence, when Yugoslavia filed certain submissions as part of its counter-claim that related exclusively to dismissal of Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s claims, those submissions were not viewed by the Court as ‘counter-claims’
within the meaning of Art. 80 of the Rules.112 Likewise, when Nicaragua filed a counter-claim
seeking to address a concern about Costa Rica’s compliance with an order on provisional
measures of protection, the Court viewed such a request as something that could be addressed
in the normal course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, and therefore did not need to be entertained as a ‘counter-claim.’113

VI. Other Party’s Right to an Additional Pleading
62

Since the counter-claim is an independent claim, para. 2 of Art. 80 of the

Rules establishes procedural equality as between the two claims, by making clear the right of
the ‘other party’ (i.e. the applicant) to ‘present its views in writing on the counter-claim, in an
additional pleading’. Thus, whatever schedule may be set by the Court for addressing the
merits of the principal claim in the case, which under Art. 45 of the Rules of Court always
allows the respondent to file the final written pleading on the principal claim, the ‘other party’ to the counter-claim will then be allowed to file a further written pleading that exclusively
addresses its final views on the counter-claim. In this way, equal treatment is preserved as
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between the parties with regard to their respective claims.114
63

Thus, when the Court decided favourably on the admission of Yugoslavia’s

counter-claim in the (Bosnian) Genocide case, it stated in its Order that ‘it is necessary moreover, in order to ensure strict equality between the parties, to reserve the right of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to present its views in writing a second time on the Yugoslav counter-claims, in
an additional pleading which may be the subject of a subsequent Order’. 115 The same language was included in its Orders for Oil Platforms,116 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Armed Activities (DRC v. Uganda),117 and (Croatian) Genocide.118 Thereafter, the applicants took advantage of this possibility to file a supplemental
pleading. For example, in Oil Platforms, Iran filed its ‘Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim’
in March 1999 addressing both the US position on the claim and counter-claim; the United
States filed its rejoinder in March 2001 responding to those arguments; and then Iran filed a
final ‘Further Response to the United States of America Counter-claim’ in September 2001,
which related solely to the counter-claim arguments made by the United States in its rejoinder.
64

Although Art. 80, para. 2 of the Rules addresses only an additional pleading

‘in writing’, the same approach carries on through to the oral hearing. After the respondent’s
final oral statement (whether arising in a first or second round of the oral hearing), the ‘other
party’ is entitled to make an oral statement limited exclusively to its final views on the coun-
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ter-claim. Thus, in Oil Platforms, at the end of the first round of the oral hearing, Iran was
provided the opportunity to make an oral presentation limited solely to the US counter-claim,
and was again allowed that opportunity at the very end of the second round.119

VII. Procedure for Deciding the Admissibility of the Counter-Claim
65

Article 80, para. 3 of the Rules provides minimal guidance with respect to the

procedure for deciding on the admissibility of the counter-claim, but practice has helped to
indicate the procedures that the Court will likely follow.120 The respondent would normally
explain, as a part of filing the counter-claim with the Counter-Memorial, why the counterclaim meets the two admissibility requirements. The President or Vice-President of the Court
would then ascertain, in a meeting of the parties, whether the applicant has objections to the
admissibility of the counter-claim. As noted earlier, if there is no objection, the Court must
still satisfy itself that the two requirements of para. 1 are met, a decision that apparently may
be reached without receiving any further views from the parties, unless the Court ‘deems
necessary’ receiving such views per Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules.
66

In cases before the Permanent Court, such as Factory at Chorzów, and in the

initial cases before the International Court, including the Asylum and Rights of US Nationals
in Morocco cases, the Court did not dispose of issues concerning the admissibility of the
counter-claim in a preliminary proceeding. Instead, such issues were folded into the pleadings
on the merits relating to the principal claim. Conversely, the Court has often disposed of the
admissibility of the counter-claim at a preliminary stage, pursuant to an order addressing exclusively the admissibility of the counter-claim, whether or not the respondent has objected to
the admissibility of the counter-claim. Thus, in the Land and Maritime Boundary case, Cam-
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eroon did not object to the admissibility of Nigeria’s counter-claims, but the Court still issued
an order indicating why the twin requirements of Art. 80 of the Rules had been met. Article
80, para. 3 of the Rules, however, does not require that the matter be disposed of at a preliminary stage.
67

If there is an objection by the respondent to the admissibility of the counter-

claim, Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules provides that ‘the court shall take its decision thereon after
hearing the parties’. Again, the rule does not expressly require that the matter be disposed of
at a preliminary stage; the issue of admissibility could be addressed as part of the reply and
rejoinder pleadings filed in relation to the merits of claim and counter-claim. Nevertheless, in
recent years the Court has instead initiated an incidental proceeding, ordering the applicant to
comment in writing upon the admissibility of the counter-claim under Art. 80 of the Rules
and the respondent to react to those views in writing. Doing so has the advantage of determining at an early stage whether the counter-claim should be included as part of the case. The
disadvantages are that: (1) initiation of an incidental proceeding slows down the process of
dealing with the applicant’s claim; and (2) at such an early stage, it may be difficult to determine whether the counter-claim is directly connected to the principal claim, since all the relevant facts and law on that claim have not been fully developed through pleadings on the merits. In his separate opinion in Oil Platforms, Judge Oda lamented this approach, which he
viewed as an unfortunate departure from the Court’s past practice.121
68

May the applicant solely object to the jurisdiction of the counter-claim during

the incidental proceeding, leaving for a later phase a possible objection as to whether the
counter-claim is ‘directly connected’ to the principal claim? In the Jurisdictional Immunities
case, Germany immediately objected to the Court’s jurisdiction over Italy’s counter-claim,
but did ‘not deem it useful at this stage of the proceedings to engage in a legal battle about
121
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the links between’ the principal claim and the counter-claim.122 Further, Germany asserted
that there were other reasons as well that the counter-claim might be inadmissible and that
‘Germany reserves the right to raise such additional preliminary objections, if need be, at a
later stage’.123 Italy responded by acknowledging ‘Germany’s right to leave open for now the
question of the direct connection’, but expressed concern that doing so was not consistent
with a prompt and efficient disposition of issues that Germany wished to raise. 124 Since the
Court found that it had no jurisdiction over the counter-claim, the Court did not squarely address one way or the other whether it is permissible to challenge, in a preliminary phase, only
the issue of jurisdiction.125
69

Article 80, para. 3 of the Rules is not clear as to whether ‘hearing the parties’

requires that, whenever an applicant objects, the Court should provide an opportunity for an
oral hearing.126 Prior to the 1978 version of the rule, there was no language at all addressing
the issue of ‘hearing’ the parties, referring instead to the Court simply engaging in ‘due examination’ of the matter. The 1978 version of the Rule stated that ‘in the event of doubt as to
the connection between’ the claim and counter-claim, ‘the Court shall, after hearing the parties, decide’ the matter. That formulation of the rule applied in the (Bosnian) Genocide case.
After Yugoslavia’s counter-claim was filed, both parties apparently contemplated, during a
meeting with the President of the Court, that they would submit written views to the Court on
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the counter-claims admissibility and then ‘be heard orally on the question’.127 The parties
then submitted their written views. Thereafter, the Court decided, having received ‘full and
detailed written observations’, that ‘it does not appear necessary to hear the Parties otherwise
on the subject’.128 Judge Koroma thought that the Court should have conducted an oral hearing,129 as did ad hoc Judges Lauterpacht130 and Kreća, with the latter asserting that ‘“hearing”
as a term of procedure before the Court denotes, in the sense of Article 43, paragraph 5, and
Article 51 of the Statute, oral proceedings before the Court’. 131 Their views, however, were
obviously not persuasive to the Court.
70

In Oil Platforms, the 1978 formulation was also at issue. Iran requested an oral

hearing on its objection to the admissibility of the counter-claim both in its meeting with the
Court and in its written observations.132 By contrast, the United States argued that no hearing
was required under Art. 80 of the Rules, or in the context of the circumstances of Iran’s particular objection, given that there was no ‘doubt’ that the principal claim was connected to the
counter-claim.133 Again, the Court decided that it was not necessary to hear further from the
parties by means of an oral hearing.134 Judge Oda, in his separate opinion, questioned the
propriety of finding a counter-claim admissible without having an oral hearing but, here too,
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his position was not accepted.135
71

In 2000, the rule was changed to its present formulation, such that where an

objection is raised or whenever the Court deems necessary, ‘the Court shall take its decision
thereon after hearing the parties’. This formulation also does not expressly require an oral
hearing. In the Jurisdictional Immunities case, the Court received written pleadings from the
parties with respect to Germany’s objection to the counter-claim and chose to decide the matter based solely on those pleadings.136 Judge Gaja, sitting as an ad hoc judge appointed by
Italy, stated in his declaration that the wording introduced in 2000 ‘appears to imply that an
oral hearing should be held’ and that doing so ‘seems particularly justified when an objection
relates to jurisdiction, given the impact of a decision on jurisdiction’, including the inability
to bring the counter-claim as a separate case.137 Similarly, Judge Cançado Trindade, the lone
dissenter to the Court’s order, asserted that the Court ‘should’ have held an oral hearing,
though he did not indicate whether doing so was required under Art. 80, para. 3 of the
Rules.138 Such arguments, however, were not viewed as persuasive by the other judges. As
such, it appears that the Court does not regard Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules, even under its
current formulation, as requiring an oral hearing. Indeed, the Court has not held a hearing in
any of the cases to date in which the admissibility of a counter-claim has been disputed. 139
VIII. Withdrawal of the Counter-Claim
72

If no objection is made or if any objections are rejected by the Court, then the
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Court’s review of the counter-claim will proceed to the merits phase, in conjunction with its
consideration of the merits of the principal claim. Prior to addressing the counter-claim on the
merits, however, the respondent is free to withdraw the counter-claim with the consent of the
other party, in the same manner that any claim can be discontinued.140
73

For example, in the (Bosnian) Genocide case, the 1997 counter-claims filed by

Yugoslavia were deemed admissible by the Court. In 2001, however, Yugoslavia notified the
Court that it wished to withdraw the counter-claims. The Court notified Bosnia and Herzegovina, which indicated that it had no objection. The Court then allowed the counter-claims
to be withdrawn.141 In Fisheries case, Norway apparently initially ‘reserved’ a counter-claim
against the United Kingdom for costs associated with capturing UK vessels that were allegedly wrongfully fishing in Norwegian waters.142 The Court decided the principal claim largely
in favour of Norway, but without directly addressing the ‘counter-claim’; after the Court
transmitted its 1951 judgment to Norway, Norway informed the Court that it no longer intended to assert its counter-claim.143

IX. Further Objections to the Counter-Claim at the Merits Phase
74

As indicated earlier, often the counter-claim has been found admissible by the

Court (the Jurisdictional Immunities case being the primary exception). Unless the counterclaim is withdrawn, then the Court proceeds to the merits phase, where the parties are expected to plead to the merits of the counter-claim in conjunction with their pleadings on the
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merits of the principal claim.
75

Even at this ‘Merits’ stage, however, the applicant is capable of challenging

aspects of jurisdiction and admissibility of the counter-claim other than what was already
decided in the context of the incidental proceeding under Art. 80 of the Rules. Thus, at the
merits phase of Oil Platforms, Iran contended that it was entitled to raise any objections to
the jurisdiction of the Court over, and the admissibility of, the US counter-claim that were not
decided as a part of the Court’s 1998 order on admissibility under Art. 80 of the Rules. To
that end, Iran challenged the US counter-claim on the grounds that: (1) it was not presented
after the negotiations required under the 1955 Treaty compromissory clause; (2) the United
States cannot espouse claims on behalf of other States or of non-US entities, whose vessels or
property were allegedly harmed; (3) the counter-claim extended beyond Art. X, para. 1 of the
1955 Treaty, the only provision over which the Court found it has jurisdiction; (4) the counter-claim concerned ‘freedom of navigation’ issues, but the Court’s jurisdiction over the principal claim only concerned ‘freedom of commerce’; and (5) the United States could not
broaden the scope of the counter-claim beyond what was expressly addressed in the submissions to its Counter-Memorial.144
76

The United States argued that all issues of jurisdiction and admissibility were

resolved with the Court’s order on the admissibility of the counter-claim under Art. 80 of the
Rules. The Court did not accept that position, stating instead:
The Court considers that it is open to Iran at this stage of the proceedings to raise objections to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the counter-claim or to its admissibility,
other than those addressed by the Order of 10 March 1998. When in that Order the Court
ruled on the ‘admissibility’ of the counter-claim, the task of the Court at that stage was
only to verify whether or not the requirements laid down by Article 80 of the Rules were
144
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satisfied, namely, that there was a direct connection of the counter-claim with the subject-matter of the Iranian claims, and that, to the extent indicated in paragraph 102 above,
the counter-claim fell within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Order of 10 March 1998
therefore does not address any other question relating to jurisdiction and admissibility,
not directly linked to Article 80 of the Rules. This is clear from the terms of the Order, by
which the Court found that the counter-claim was admissible ‘as such’; and in paragraph
41 of the Order the Court further stated that: ‘a decision given on the admissibility of a
counter-claim taking account of the requirements set out in Article 80 of the Rules in no
way prejudges any question which the Court will be called upon to hear during the remainder of the proceedings’ (ibid., p. 205, para. 41). The Court will therefore proceed to
address the objections now presented by Iran to its jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim and to the admissibility thereof.145
77

Thus, the Court’s view is that the decision reached on jurisdiction at the inci-

dental proceedings phase is not a definitive view on the Court’s jurisdiction over the counterclaim. In the context of the US counter-claim, all the Court had decided in 1998 was that the
facts pled by the United States ‘were facts capable of falling within the scope of Article X,
paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty’ and ‘that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the United
States counter-claim in so far as the facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1’.146 Likewise, any issues of admissibility other than the ‘direct
connection’ of the counter-claim to the claim may be raised at the merits phase. As it turned
out, in Oil Platforms the Court then proceeded to reject each of Iran’s objections to the
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Court’s jurisdiction over or the admissibility of the counter-claim.147
78

The same situation arose in Armed Activities (DRC/Uganda). At the merits

phase, the DRC advanced several objections to the Court’s jurisdiction over and the admissibility of Uganda’s counter-claim. The Court permitted those objections, saying that the ‘enquiry under Article 80 as to admissibility is only in regard to the question whether a counterclaim is directly connected with the subject-matter of the principal claim; it is not an overarching test of admissibility’.148 That statement is somewhat curious in that the Court’s analysis of Art. 80 of the Rules also concerns whether there is jurisdiction ‘as such’ over the counter-claim, even in circumstances (such as this case) where no objection was made to jurisdiction in the Art. 80 of the Rules proceeding. In any event, the DRC was permitted to object to
the admissibility of the counter-claim due to: waiver; the raising of new claims not specified
in the Counter-Memorial; the inability to advance claims on behalf of non-nationals; and the
failure to exhaust local remedies. In its judgment on the merits, the Court rejected all of those
objections and thus found the counter-claims admissible, except that it declared inadmissible
a portion of Uganda’s counter-claims which concerned ‘acts of maltreatment by [DRC]
troops of Ugandan nationals not enjoying diplomatic status who were present at Ndjili International Airport as they attempted to leave the country’.149 With respect to those individuals,
the Court found that Uganda had not established the nationality of the individuals so as to
sustain the ability to bring a counter-claim premised on diplomatic protection of persons.150
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As occurred in both Oil Platforms and Armed Activities (DRC/Uganda), one type
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148

Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), supra, fn. 23, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2005), pp. 168, 261,
para. 273.

149

Ibid., p. 276, para. 332.

150

Ibid., p. 276, para. 333.

49
of objection at the merits phase may be that the respondent is expanding the counter-claim beyond the scope of what was pled in the Counter-Memorial. In that regard, the Court stated in Oil
Platforms that the same rule applies to counter-claims as applies to claims. That is, the Court
will seek to determine whether the new element is ‘a new claim’ or whether it is merely ‘additional evidence relating to the original claim’, bearing in mind that it ‘is well established in the
Court’s jurisprudence that the parties to a case cannot in the course of proceedings “transform
the dispute brought before the Court into a dispute that would be of a different nature”’.151
Where a ‘new’ counter-claim is being presented at the merits phase beyond what was identified
in the Counter-Memorial, it appears that the Court will deem such a claim inadmissible. In both
Oil Platforms and Armed Activities (DRC/Uganda),152 the Court did not view the introduction of
new elements as transforming the counter-claim in those cases and therefore did not sustain the
objection on this issue.

X. Disposition of the Counter-Claim on the Merits
80

If the counter-claim survives the initial proceeding under Art. 80 of the Rules

and then further survives any objections to jurisdiction or admissibility that may arise at the
merits phase, and is not withdrawn along the way, the Court proceeds to decide the counterclaim on the merits. In each instance where the Court has done so, it first addresses and disposes of the principal claim before turning to the merits of the counter-claim. Both the claim
and the counter-claim are then addressed in the same dispositif to the judgment.153

151

Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2003), pp. 161, 213–4, para. 117, citing Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru/Australia), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports (1992), pp. 240,
265, para. 63.

152

Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), supra, fn. 23, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2005), pp. 168, 274–
5, paras. 322–7.

153

Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 876 et seq.

50
81

In some instances, the counter-claim will be rejected on the merits. Thus, in

Rights of US Nationals in Morocco, the Court rejected the US submissions relating to the
unlawfulness of the imposition of certain taxes and rejected the US position that customs authorities, when valuing goods, cannot take into account their value in the local Moroccan
market, stating that ‘the value of merchandise in the country of origin and its value in the
local Moroccan market are both elements in the appraisal of its cash wholesale value delivered at the customhouse’.154 In Land and Maritime Boundary, the Court found that Nigeria
had failed to prove the facts that would have supported its counter-claim, and further failed to
establish that the conduct in question was attributable to Cameroon.155 In Oil Platforms, the
Court found that the United States had failed to prove that the alleged Iranian attacks on vessels in the Persian Gulf violated the ‘freedom of commerce and navigation’ obligations set
forth in Art. X, para. 1 of the 1955 Treaty.156
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In other cases, the counter-claim may succeed on the merits, but be so closely

associated with the principal claim that the existence of the counter-claim may not make
much difference in the case. Thus, in the Asylum case, the Court agreed with the submission
in Peru’s counter-claim that Colombia’s grant of asylum was not in accordance with the applicable asylum convention; however, in denying the principal claim by Colombia (seeking to
exercise a right to grant asylum under that convention), the Court had already essentially
reached that conclusion.157
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Yet is possible for a counter-claim to succeed and thereby result in a finding
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that would not otherwise be possible in the absence of the counter-claim. In Armed Activities
(DRC/Uganda), the Court rejected the first category of Uganda’s counter-claims to the effect
that the DRC had unlawfully used force against Uganda. The Court upheld, however, much
of the second category of Uganda’s counter-claims, finding that the DRC attacked the ‘Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa, maltreated Ugandan diplomats and other individuals on the Embassy premises, maltreated Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport’, failed to protect those diplomats, and failed ‘to prevent archives and Ugandan property from being seized
from the premises of the Ugandan Embassy’, all in violation of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 1961.158 As such, the DRC—the original applicant in the case—was
found to be under an obligation to make reparation to Uganda for the injury caused. 159

D. Evaluation
84

Given the considerable attention in the ICJ Statute and the Rules of the Court

to the basic procedures for the filing of a claim by one State against another, it is remarkable
that the Statute is silent on the issue of counter-claims, while the Rules are limited to a single
article consisting of three short paragraphs. The explanation for such a lack of attention is
probably threefold. First, though counter-claims have been available to respondents throughout the life of the PCIJ and ICJ, to date they have been used quite sparingly. If counter-claims
become a more significant feature of the Court’s caseload, there may be calls for grounding
the regime of counter-claims in the Statute and in more detailed provisions of the Rules. Second, when counter-claims are used by respondents, it is possible to fold them into proceedings that already exist for the claim of the applicant; in other words, the basic procedures
used for claims are largely used mutatis mutantis for counter-claims, thereby obviating the
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need to develop detailed rules for the latter. Third, while there may be some areas of uncertainty in Art. 80 of the Rules, the Court through its jurisprudence has provided considerable
content to the meaning of that article, as discussed previously. As such, the regime of counter-claims is a good example of how the Court can develop—incrementally and over time—
sensible procedures for handling its docket.
85

Overall, the current regime appears well-suited for balancing the interests of

the applicant and the respondent. The respondent is able to place before the Court its own
grievances with respect to the applicant’s conduct, but is not able to derail the applicant’s
claim by presenting matters unrelated to that claim or outside the Court’s jurisdiction. The
applicant receives full notice of such grievances, is able to contest whether they are truly related to the applicant’s claim, and otherwise is able to litigate the merits of such grievances
just as it would if the counter-claim had been brought as a stand-alone case. In none of the
cases involving counter-claims does it appear that the filing of counter-claims had a pernicious effect on the case; rather, in most instances it appears that they allowed the Court to
receive a broader range of views on a broader range of issues than might otherwise have occurred.
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As such, the real value of the regime of counter-claims is that it advances the

Court’s role as a central institution for the pacific settlement of disputes. Disputes often arise
in a context where both sides believe the other has transgressed international legal norms.
The regime of counter-claims allows the Court to consider both sides of the dispute in a single, integrated proceeding, thereby creating the opportunity for the Court to address the dispute in a more holistic fashion. States themselves may be recognizing the value of pursuing
counter-claims, since many of the cases in which they have been filed date to just the past 20
years. Given the value to litigants in ‘levelling the playing field’ when they come before the
Court, counter-claims at the ICJ may continue to feature significantly in the years to come.
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Annex: Filing and Disposition of Counter-Claims 1928-2017
Case Name and Date of Filing of
Counterclaims

Date of Order(s) and
Judgment(s) of the Court

Counterclaim
admissible?
Yes/No

Counterclaim
upheld?
Yes/No

Judgment of 13 September 1928, PCIJ, Series A,
No. 17, p. 36

Yes

No

Judgment of Judgment of
28 June 1937, PCIJ, Series
A/B, No. 70, p. 5

Yes

No

A. Permanent Court of International Justice
1. Case concerning the Factory
at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland)
Preliminary CounterMemorial submitted by the
Government of Poland on 8
April 1927
2. Diversion of Water from the
Meuse (Netherlands v. Belgium)
Counter-Memorial submitted
by the Belgian Government
on 28 January 1937
3. Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway
(Estonia v. Lithuania)
Preliminary CounterMemorial submitted by the
Lithuanian Government on 15
March 1938

Judgment of 28 February No
1939, PCIJ, Series A/B,
No. 76, p. 7 and Series E,
No. 15, pp. 114-15 (English language version), pp.
108-109 (French language
version)

N/A

Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports
(1950), pp. 266, 280-88

Yes

Partly rejected
and partly upheld

N/A

Withdrawn

N/A

B. International Court of Justice
1. Asylum Case (Colombia v.
Peru)
Counter-Memorial submitted
by the Government of the
Republic of Peru on 21 March
1950
2. Fisheries (United Kingdom v.
Norway)
Counter-Memorial submitted
by the Government of the
Kingdom of Norway on 31 July 1950
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3. Rights of Nationals of the
United States of America in
Morocco (France v. United
States of America)

Judgment of 27 August
1952, ICJ Reports (1952),
pp. 176, 203-12

Yes

Partly rejected
and partly upheld

Yes

No

Counter-Memorial and Counter-claim submitted by the
United States of America on
23 June 1997

Order of 10 March 1998,
ICJ Reports (1998), p.
190; Order of 28 August
2001, ICJ Reports (2001),
p. 568; Judgment of 6
November 2003, ICJ Reports (2003), pp. 161,
208-18

5. Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)

Order of 17 December
1997, ICJ Reports (1997),
p. 243; Order of 10 September 2001, ICJ Reports
(2001), p. 572

Withdrawn

N/A

6. Counter-Memorial submitted
by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia on 23 July 1997
7. Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria:
Equatorial Guinea intervening)

Order of 30 June 1999,
ICJ Reports (1999), p.
983; Judgment of 10 October 2002, ICJ Reports
(2002), pp. 303, 453

Yes

No

Order of 29 November
2001, ICJ Reports (2001),
p. 660; Order of 29 January 2003, ICJ Reports
(2003), p. 3; Judgment of
19 December 2005, ICJ
Reports (2005), pp. 168,
259-79
Judgment of 3 February
2015, ICJ Reports (2015),
pp. 3, 59-60, 129-53

First and second
counter-claims:
Yes

First counterclaim: No; Second counterclaim: Yes

Counter-Memorial submitted
by the Government of the
United States of America on
20 December 1951
4. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America)

Counter-Memorial submitted
by the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 21 May 1999
8. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda)
Counter-Memorial submitted
by Uganda on 21 April 2001
9. Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)

Third counterclaim: No

Yes

No
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Counter-Memorial submitted
by Serbia on 1 December
2009
10. Jurisdictional Immunities of
the State (Germany v. Italy:
Greece intervening)

Order of 6 July 2010, ICJ
Reports (2010), p. 310

No

N/A

Order of 18 April 2013,
ICJ Reports (2013), p. 200

First counterclaim: subsumed
after joinder of
proceedings;

N/A

Counter-Memorial submitted
by Italy on 22 December 2009
11. Certain Activities carried out
by Nicaragua in the Border
Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)
Counter-Memorial submitted
by Nicaragua on 6 August
2012
(case joined with Construction of a Road in Costa Rica
(Nicaragua v. Costa Rica) on
17 April 2013)
12. Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime
Spaces in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
Counter-Memorial submitted
by Colombia by 17 November
2016

Second and third
counter-claims:
No

Order of 15 November
2017

Fourth counterclaim: no need to
entertain
First and second
counter-claims:
No
Third and fourth
counter-claims:
Yes

Not decided as
of 2017

